| Abstract: | This article is part of the multiple book review of "Deduction" by 
	    Johnson-Laird and Byrne in Brain and Behavioural Sciences. I argue 
	    that there is no difference in kind between the mental models deduction 
	    mechanism proposed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne and rule-based mechanisms 
	    for deduction. Indeed, it is possible to view many deduction mechanisms 
	    as simultaneously of both types. The issue of intentionality arises with 
	    both types of mechanism, and is not finessed by the use of a model-based 
	    approach. To the best of my knowledge Johnson-Laird and Byrne make no 
	    claim to the contrary. However, others may erroneously draw that conclusion 
	    from the free use of words like 'semantics', 'model', etc. For this reason 
	    I recommend that the word 'semantics' be used with extreme caution. It is 
	    a highly ambiguous term and has great potential to mislead.
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