Introduction Collaborative learning Strategic learning Summary

#### Collaborative and Strategic Multiagent Learning (Machine Learning in the Agents Group)

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#### Agents & Multiagent Systems

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## Agents & Multiagent Systems

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- Agents research is concerned with the coordination of intelligent capabilities in a single (single-agent) or several distributed (multiagent) systems
- When strictly collaborative, similar to very loosely coupled distributed systems; when not, distinct from other CS/AI technologies

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- Some examples follow (joint work with Belesiotis, Collins, Figari, Fischer, Mhatre, Nickles, Pechoucek, Rafael, Sferopoulos, Tozicka, Weiss, Whitaker, Wolf)

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- Applied to vessel surveillance and distributed brain tumor diagnosis

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- ► We can do better than in completely unstructured environments
- Hard to achieve balance between learning and teaching; also, learning always has to be done online

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- Main result: opponent classification boosts learning speed and improves average rewards when playing with unknown opponents
- Later expanded this to a two-player soccer playing domain using Bayesian models rather than FSMs

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- Ongoing work, will use hierarchical reinforcement learning methods and "machine games" studied in game theory

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- Estimation process biased by rationality considerations about the other player's behaviour in the game (in the honesty-modified game they should behave rationally)

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- Based on heuristic that constantly monitors whether advice is useful and whether other agents are following advice, too

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- In the future we want to extend this to non-cooperative domains to investigate deception in communication

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- Evaluated in domain of strategic linkage between web sites

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- Any questions?