Abstract: | This article is part of the multiple book review of "Deduction" by
Johnson-Laird and Byrne in Brain and Behavioural Sciences. I argue
that there is no difference in kind between the mental models deduction
mechanism proposed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne and rule-based mechanisms
for deduction. Indeed, it is possible to view many deduction mechanisms
as simultaneously of both types. The issue of intentionality arises with
both types of mechanism, and is not finessed by the use of a model-based
approach. To the best of my knowledge Johnson-Laird and Byrne make no
claim to the contrary. However, others may erroneously draw that conclusion
from the free use of words like 'semantics', 'model', etc. For this reason
I recommend that the word 'semantics' be used with extreme caution. It is
a highly ambiguous term and has great potential to mislead.
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